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CRIMINALIZING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
Sean D. Murphy*
The States Parties of the International Criminal Court (ICC) will
likely vote in 2010 on whether to amend the Rome Statute to allow the ICC
to prosecute the crime of aggression. If a robust amendment is widely ratified by states, and if the mechanism for triggering ICC jurisdiction in a particular situation is the ICC itself, then the ICC may emerge as an important
voice in the debate over the legality of humanitarian intervention taken
without Security Council authorization. Prosecutions, or at least indictments, of leaders of those interventions would considerably strengthen the
hand of those who regard such intervention as illegal. Yet an unwillingness
on the part of the ICC to indict and prosecute those leaders—an outcome
that seems likely for incidents of true humanitarian intervention—may lend
considerable credence to the view that such intervention is lawful, as well
as define the conditions that characterize such intervention.
INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of “humanitarian intervention” essentially contemplates the use of military force by one state (or a group of states) against
another state not in self-defense but, rather, to prevent the widespread deprivation of human rights. While such use of force might occur pursuant to
authorization of the Security Council, the doctrine’s principal relevance is to
serve as a potential legal justification for a state or states to act without Security Council authorization, conduct sometimes referred to as “unilateral”
humanitarian intervention.
As discussed in Part I below, the dominant belief among states and
scholars of international law is that unilateral humanitarian intervention is
not a valid legal justification for using force. Security Council authorization
must be obtained for any such intervention; where such consent is not forthcoming, the values served by maintaining a strong normative system against
transnational uses of force must prevail over values advanced in attempting
to thwart human rights abuses. Some states and scholars, however, see international law as permitting such intervention, and some incidents of state
practice—such as NATO’s 1999 intervention in Serbia to protect Kosovar
*
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Albanians from the anticipated infliction of atrocities by their own government—lend credence to that position. On this account, since human rights
are now an integral component of international law, the failure of a sovereign to uphold its obligations to protect its nationals concomitantly diminishes that sovereign’s right to rely on the principle of non-intervention to
protect it from other states. Further, even some observers who reject the
notion that unilateral humanitarian intervention is presently lawful nevertheless recognize that the law may be changing, or that the international community will tolerate deviations from the law when unilateral humanitarian
intervention occurs.
Scholars attempting to resolve this debate have looked to various
sources as a means of supporting one position or the other. When assessing
incidents of state practice that arguably constitute unilateral humanitarian
intervention, one approach has been to scrutinize the formal and informal
reactions to those incidents by important organs, such as the Security Council, the General Assembly, or the International Court of Justice, since these
entities might be seen as serving as a “jury” for the global community about
the legality of the conduct. This jurying function might be performed before
the intervention takes place (ex ante jurying) or, more likely, after the intervention takes place (ex post jurying). To date, the above-mentioned organs
have been unable or unwilling to consistently assess incidents of alleged
humanitarian intervention, thus undermining their ability to forcefully condemn, support, or support with caveats the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention.
One jury, however, “remains out” in the sense that it has not yet
weighed in on the issue of humanitarian intervention. As discussed in Part
II, the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute, which created the
International Criminal Court (ICC), will likely vote in 2010 on whether to
amend the Rome Statute so as to allow the ICC to investigate and prosecute
the crime of aggression. The language to be adopted is not yet settled, but it
seems unlikely that unilateral humanitarian intervention will be expressly
included or excluded from the Rome Statute’s definition of aggression, or
from the associated “elements of the crime” that will likely be crafted before entry into force of the amendment. While the amendment (and associated elements) may provide some openings for the argument that unilateral humanitarian intervention implicitly does not fall within the scope of such
a crime, it seems more likely that the acts that typically underlie such intervention (large-scale deployment of troops or delivery of bombs across a
border against a non-consenting government) will implicitly fall within the
scope of the crime of aggression for purposes of the ICC. If that is the case,
this article argues that there is an ironic chance (but not certainty) that the
ICC, over time, will serve as a “jury” that results in the crystallization of a
norm permitting unilateral humanitarian intervention.
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Numerous hurdles must be overcome before the ICC could serve
such a function, hurdles that should not be minimized. An amendment to the
Rome Statute does need to be adopted by the Assembly, most of the states
parties must then ratify the amendment to bring it into force, the amendment
must be crafted so as not to allow states parties to opt out of its reach in any
significant ways, and the amendment must be applied in a manner that
reaches the conduct of states generally, including non-parties that use force
against the territory of states parties.
Even if those hurdles are overcome, the mere fact that the ICC
mandate is broad enough to potentially encompass prosecutions of leaders
who engage in unilateral humanitarian intervention will likely not affect the
debate about the legality of humanitarian intervention; such an effect would
occur only if the Rome Statute expressly included (or excluded) such intervention as part of the crime of aggression. Further, if the mechanism for
triggering ICC investigation of a crime of aggression is solely the Security
Council, or perhaps the General Assembly or the International Court of Justice, then the ICC’s adoption of this jurisdiction likely will not affect the
debate over the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention, since it is
unlikely that those institutions will consistently, impartially, and apolitically
“pull the trigger” for ICC jurisdiction over a given situation, conditions necessary for clarifying the law in this area.
However, if a relatively robust amendment is widely ratified by
states, and if the mechanism for triggering an ICC investigation is the ICC
itself (the prosecutor acting alone or in conjunction with the Pre-Trial
Chamber), then this article maintains that there may well be a significant
effect on the debate over the legality of humanitarian intervention, driven by
how the ICC responds when incidents of unilateral humanitarian intervention arise over which it has jurisdiction. Prosecutions, or at least indictments, of leaders of those interventions would considerably strengthen the
hand of those who oppose unilateral humanitarian intervention. Yet an unwillingness on the part of the ICC to indict and prosecute those leaders—an
outcome that seems quite likely for incidents of true humanitarian intervention—may lend considerable credence to the view that unilateral humanitarian intervention is lawful, as well as define the conditions that characterize
such intervention.
To demonstrate that likelihood, this article revisits NATO’s 1999
intervention to protect Kosovar Albanians. Having reached that incident’s
tenth anniversary, it is worth asking whether such action, had it arisen at a
time when there existed an ICC with jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, would have resulted in the indictment of NATO leaders by the ICC. If
not, then it may unfold that true humanitarian interventions—interventions
generally recognized as largely altruistic acts to protect those facing extreme peril—will be viewed as lawful even in the absence of Security
Council authorization. If so, then the ICC will have assumed a very signifi-
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cant role in altering the perceptions of the international community concerning the use of force, potentially in a manner that significantly diminishes the
role of the U.N. Security Council. Assumption of such a role may propel the
ICC to significant heights as the “go-to” arbiter on the legality of the use of
force, or may result in extraordinary criticism of its work and concerns
about its fidelity to strict construction of the law.
Part I of this article briefly explains the conflicting views among
states and in the academy about the legality of the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention, and why several possible avenues for “jurying” legality to date
have proven unhelpful. Part II then considers the likely approach of granting
the ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, with a focus on the ratification process for the amendment, and on the substance and procedure of
that jurisdiction as it relates to humanitarian intervention. If various important hurdles can be overcome (which may well not be the case), this part
tentatively concludes that such jurisdiction most likely will result, over
time, in the crystallization of a norm that permits unilateral humanitarian
intervention. Part III tests that conclusion by revisiting the Kosovo incident,
which is probably the strongest precedent to date in favor of the legality of
humanitarian intervention, to assess whether it would have provoked ICC
indictments had there existed, at that time, an ICC with jurisdiction over a
crime of aggression. Part IV concludes with some speculations on how inclusion of a robust crime of aggression within the ICC’s jurisdiction might
affect views not just on the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention,
but also on what is meant by such intervention, and further the potential
benefits and risks for the ICC in assuming such a role.
I. THE (IL)LEGALITY OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
A.

Conflicting Views on the Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention

Virtually all states, key non-state actors, and scholars agree that
humanitarian intervention may proceed when authorized by the U.N. Security Council.1 While it is true that the drafters of Chapter VII of the U.N.
1

See, e.g., Jennifer M. Welsh, The Security Council and Humanitarian Intervention, in
THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR 535, 535–36 (Vaughn Lowe et al. eds.,
2008) (“[W]hile the Council initially was reluctant to authorize force in circumstances involving the mistreatment of a state’s civilians, it has gradually asserted its competence
through an expanded definition of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security.”); THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND
ARMED ATTACKS 137 (2002) (“Each of the instances in which the Council has used, or authorized coalitions of the willing to use collective measures . . . against regimes engaged in
egregious human rights violations can be fitted in to the Charter text.”); SEAN D. MURPHY,
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 28788 (1996) (reflecting on U.N. practice in the 1990’s and noting that a “threat to the peace”
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Charter probably envisaged some kind of transnational threat to or breach of
the peace prior to Security Council action, the Charter does not expressly
require such an act, nor does it preclude viewing the transnational agitation
that typically arises from widespread deprivations of human rights within a
state from being within the scope of Chapter VII. In any event, the consistent interpretation of Chapter VII by the Security Council—particularly with
respect to the recent interventions authorized in Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia—makes clear that widespread deprivations of human rights can serve as
the basis for authorizing the use of military force under the authority of
Chapter VII.2
The more contentious issue is the legality of humanitarian intervention without U.N. Security Council authorization. The remainder of this
article is concerned with such unauthorized or “unilateral” humanitarian
intervention. Most states and scholars view unilateral humanitarian intervention as unlawful, finding no basis in the U.N. Charter or state practice in
support of the doctrine.3 Only rarely have incidents occurred that might be
viewed as unilateral humanitarian intervention, and, when they do occur,
they are often criticized or condemned by states and sometimes other relevant actors, such as the Security Council or the General Assembly. Writing
in the immediate aftermath of the Kosovo intervention, Adam Roberts explained the resistance of states to unilateral humanitarian intervention as
follows:
Several large and powerful states (China, India and Russia) have expressed
strong opposition to the principle of humanitarian intervention. Equally
important, large numbers of post-colonial states, particularly in Africa and
Asia, have opposed it. Many such states have a healthy suspicion of the
proposition that the motives of would-be intervenors are, and will remain,
purely humanitarian. Also, many such states see themselves as vulnerable
to foreign intervention, and are understandably sensitive about threats to
their newly-won sovereignty. In some cases, other and less creditable considerations are involved, including the desire of oppressive regimes to stop

triggering Security Council jurisdiction under Chapter VII is now regarded as encompassing
internal conflict, including humanitarian crises).
2
See MURPHY, supra note 1, at 145–281.
3
See, e.g., CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 49 (2d ed.
2004) (2000) (finding that “the doctrine is far from firmly established in international law”);
Michael Byers & Simon Chesterman, Changing Rules about Rules? Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention and the Future of International Law, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:
ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 177, 177–203 (J. L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003); SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE? HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 45–87 (2001); Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and
the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (1999).
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the emergence of a new norm that might upset their monopoly of power
within their states.4

Either in the context of specific incidents or looking more broadly
at the legality of uses of military force, the General Assembly historically
has disfavored intervention, even for noble purposes, as amply demonstrated by the three prominent General Assembly resolutions on nonintervention passed in the 1960s and 1970s.5 Indeed, the General Assembly’s 1974 “Definition of Aggression” enumerated various acts that constitute “aggression,” including the “invasion or attack by the armed forces of a
State of the territory of another State,” and provided that no “consideration
of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may
serve as a justification for aggression.”6 Those resolutions were passed in an
era when newly emerging states were reacting to the abuses of colonialism,
and to the fear of Cold War interference by the major powers, but many of
those suspicions linger today.7 When foreign ministers of the non-aligned
movement met in Catagena in 2000, they reiterated a “firm condemnation of
all unilateral military actions including those made without property authorisation from the United Nations Security Council” and rejected “the socalled ‘right’ of humanitarian intervention, which has no legal basis in the

4

See Adam Roberts, The So-Called “Right” of Humanitarian Intervention, 2000 Y.B.
INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 3, 32.
5
See Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States
and their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), U.N. Doc. A/6014 (Dec. 21,
1966) (“No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in
the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all
other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against
its political, economic and cultural elements are condemned. . . . The strict observance of
these obligations is an essential condition to ensure that nations live together in peace with
one another, since the practice of any form of intervention not only violates the spirit and
letter of the Charter of the United Nations but also leads to the creation of situations which
threaten peace and security.”); Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), annex, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (Oct. 24, 1971) (“No
State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention
and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or
against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international law.”).
6
G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), annex, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1975).
7
Drawing in part upon the General Assembly’s views, the International Court in the
Nicaragua/U.S. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua case cast
doubt on the ability of states to use force to protect human rights, (Nicar. V. U.S.), Merits,
Judgments, 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 134–35 (June 27), or to bring about regime change, id. at 133, ¶
263, though in that case the facts and arguments pled to the Court were not directly on those
issues.
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UN Charter or in the general principles of international law.”8 Most recently, in its 2005 World Summit Outcome document, the General Assembly
considered the problem of responding to major human rights crises through
military force and appeared to contemplate only action through the U.N.
Security Council.9
Generally speaking, opponents of unilateral humanitarian intervention favor the strictest of controls on transnational uses of force, distrusting
the creation of loopholes that aggressors will seek to exploit. Some opponents, however, are open to the possibility of humanitarian intervention, but
simply do not see existing treaties or state practice as supporting it. Especially in the wake of the Kosovo incident, some of these scholars10 and former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan11 became more open to seeing a

8
MOVEMENT OF THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES, XIII Ministerial Conference, Cartagena,
Colombia, FINAL DOCUMENT, ¶ 11, 263 (Apr. 8-9, 2000), available at http://www.nam.gov
.za/xiiiminconf/index.html.
9
2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138–39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct.
24, 2005) (“In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive
manner, through the Security Council . . . on a case-by-case basis . . . should peaceful means
be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.”); but see Stahn, infra
note 19, at 120 (arguing that “states did not categorically reject the option of (individual or
collective) unilateral action in the Outcome Document. This discrepancy leaves some leeway
to argue that the concept of responsibility to protect is not meant to rule out such action in the
future.”).
10
See, e.g., INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT:
CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 172 (2000) [hereinafter Kosovo
Report] (“[T]he current fluidity of international law on humanitarian intervention, caught
between strict Charter prohibitions of non-defensive uses of force and more permissive patterns of state practice with respect to humanitarian interventions and counter-terrorist use of
force.”); Christine Chinkin, The Legality of NATO’s Action in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) Under International Law, 49 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 910, 920 (2000) (acknowledging that there may be an “emerging concept of humanitarian intervention based upon the
purposes of the Charter, the growing commitment to the active protection of human rights
and limited State practice”); Vaughan Lowe, International Legal Issues Arising in the Kosovo Crisis, 49 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 934, 941 (2000) (“[I]n my view there is no clear legal
justification for the NATO action in Kosovo, but it is desirable that such a justification be
allowed to emerge in customary international law.”).
11
In his annual report to the General Assembly in 1999, Secretary-General Kofi Annan
stated:
This developing international norm in favour of intervention to protect civilians
from wholesale slaughter will no doubt continue to pose profound challenges to the
international community. Any such evolution in our understanding of State sovereignty and individual sovereignty will, in some quarters, be met with distrust,
skepticism, even hostility. But it is an evolution that we should welcome. Why?
Because, despite its limitations and imperfections, it is testimony to a humanity
that cares more, not less, for the suffering in its midst, and a humanity that will do
more, and not less, to end it.
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nascent trend toward acceptance of humanitarian intervention, but did not
go so far as to find that a new rule had crystallized.
By contrast, some scholars and a few states, notably the United
Kingdom12 and Belgium,13 have claimed that there already exists a legal
norm in favor of unilateral humanitarian intervention, based on interpretations of the U.N. Charter or on a generous reading of limited state practice,
including the interventions of ECOWAS in Liberia in 1990 and in Sierra
Leone in 1998, the tripartite intervention in northern Iraq in 1991 and southern Iraq in 1992, and the Kosovo incident, all of which were largely accepted or at least tolerated by the global community.14 While they place

Press Release, The Secretary-General, Annual Report to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
SG/SM7136 (Sept. 20, 1999), reprinted in KOFI ANNAN, THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION:
STATEMENTS BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 44 (1999). For sharp criticism of the SecretaryGeneral’s position, see Edward Luttwak, Kofi’s Rule: Humanitarian Intervention and Neocolonialism, 58 NAT’L INT. 60 (Winter 1999–00).
12
The United Kingdom justified its participation in the intervention relating to Kosovo as
follows:
We are in no doubt that NATO is acting within international law. Our legal justification rests upon the accepted principle that force may be used in extreme circumstances to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. Those circumstances clearly exist in
Kosovo. The use of force . . . can be justified as an exceptional measure in support
of the purposes laid down by the UN Security Council, but without the Council’s
express authorization, when that is the only means to avert an immediate and
overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe.
U.K. Defence Secretary George Robertson, 328 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1999) 616–17;
see also U.N. SCOR, Fifty-Fourth Sess., 3988 mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3988 (Mar. 23,
1999) (comments of U.K. Ambassador Sir Jeremy Greenstock explaining that: “In these
circumstances, and as an exceptional measure on grounds of overwhelming humanitarian
necessity, military intervention is legally justifiable”); Verbatim Record, Oral Proceedings,
Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Mont. v. U.K.), at 13 (May 11, 1999), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/113/4573.pdf (U.K. Attorney-General John Morris repeating such language); Prime Minister Tony Blair, Written Answer for House of Commons, 330
PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1999) 239-40; MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW 99 (2005) (discussing
the U.K. position). It should be noted that the U.K. House of Commons Foreign Affairs
Committee rejected the U.K. position, finding that international law did not allow unilateral
humanitarian intervention. See HOUSE OF COMMONS COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
FOURTH REPORT ON KOSOVO, 1999-2000, ¶ 128, available at http://www.publications.parlia
ment.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/2802.htm (“Our conclusion is that Operation
Allied Force was contrary to the specific terms of what might be termed the basic law of the
international community—the UN Charter.”); see also Steven Wheatley, The Foreign Affairs
Select Committee Report on Kosovo: NATO Action and Humanitarian Intervention, 5 J.
CONFLICT & SEC. L. 261 (2000).
13
See Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Mont. v. Belg.), Verbatim Record, Oral Proceedings at 7 (May 10, 1999), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/105/4515.pdf.
14
See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER & JENS DAVID OHLIN, DEFENDING HUMANITY: WHEN
FORCE IS JUSTIFIED AND WHY (2008); CHRISTOPHER GREENWOOD, HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: LAW AND POLICY (2001); see also Richard Lillich, Humanitarian Interven-
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some emphasis on positive law (as evidenced by treaties, state practice, and
other forms of state consent), proponents of unilateral humanitarian intervention often advance arguments that are essentially grounded in morality,
natural law, or political theory.15 Indeed, to a certain extent one can view the
legal debate on this issue as one between “positivists” (opposing unilateral
humanitarian intervention) and “naturalists” (favoring such intervention by
adhering closely—even if not explicitly—to natural law, derived from the
rudimentary values held by the “global society”). For the proponents of
humanitarian intervention, international law exists only in part to preserve
the sanctity of states; the dignity of persons is of equal value and in some
situations “trumps” the values protected by strict rules on non-intervention.
In between these two positions may be found a few scholars or institutions that view humanitarian intervention as unlawful, but accept or at
least acknowledge that such action may be legitimate and hence will be
tacitly accepted by the global community when it occurs. For example, Professor Thomas Franck states that it is “difficult conceptually to justify in
Charter terms the use of force by one or several states acting without prior
Security Council authorization, even when such action is taken to enforce
human rights and humanitarian values,” but that contemporary practice
“suggests either a graduated reinterpretation by the United Nations itself of
Article 2(4) or the evolution of a subsidiary adjectival international law of
mitigation, one that may formally continue to assert the illegality of state
recourse to force but which, in ascertainable circumstances, mitigates the
consequence of such wrongful acts by imposing no, or only nominal, consequences on states which, by their admittedly wrongful intervention, have
demonstrably prevented the occurrence of some greater wrong.”16 Along
tion: A Reply to Dr. Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND CIVIL
WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 229 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974).
15
See, e.g., FERNANDO R. TESÓN, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW
AND MORALITY (3d ed. 2005) (advancing an argument largely grounded in Kantian philosophy); NICHOLAS J. WHEELER, SAVING STRANGERS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 295 (2000) (advancing an “solidarist” conception of international
society in which states must accept a moral responsibility to protect their citizens).
16
Franck, supra note 1, at 137, 139 (emphasis added); see also Thomas M. Franck, Humanitarian and Other Interventions, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 321, 325 (2005) (suggesting that “a violation of the law is not always deplorable and may even be a good thing”);
Allen Buchanan, Reforming the International Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 130 (J. L.
Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003); ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INT’L AFFAIRS AND
ADVISORY COMM. ON ISSUES OF PUB. INT’L LAW, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (2000),
available at http://cms.web-beat.nl/ContentSuite/upload/aiv/doc/AIV_13_Eng.pdf (report by
non-governmental Dutch advisory council which endorses the “illegal but legitimate” concept); Ige F. Dekker, Illegality and Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention, 6 J. CONFLICT
& SEC. L. 115 (2001) (discussing the Dutch report); DANISH INST. OF INT’L AFFAIRS,
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS 103 (1999) (“Despite the
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this line, an Independent International Commission on Kosovo, initiated by
Sweden shortly after the Kosovo incident and chaired by former South African Justice Richard Goldstone, issued a report stating that the NATO military intervention was illegal under international law, because it did not have
the consent of the Security Council, but was “legitimate,” both from a political and moral point of view.17 Similarly, an International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (established by the Government
of Canada) issued a December 2001 report, entitled The Responsibility to
Protect, which sought to provide a legal and ethical foundation for humanitarian intervention.18 The report asserted that a responsibility to protect (or
“R2P”)19 exists under international law. Further, the report stated that in
circumstances when the Security Council fails to discharge that responsibility, “in a conscience-shocking situation crying out for action,” then it “is a
real question in these circumstances where lies the most harm: in the damage to international order if the Security Council is bypassed or in the damage to that order if human beings are slaughtered while the Security Council
stands by.”20
By contrast, a 2005 U.N. high-level panel convened by SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan, writing in the wake of the 2003 U.S. intervention in
Iraq, agreed with the ICISS that there existed an “emerging norm that there
is a collective international responsibility to protect,” but concluded that
armed force may be used to ensure fulfillment of that the responsibility only
if so authorized by the Security Council.21 Further, the high-level panel
identified five criteria of “legitimacy” when engaging in such intervention,
lack of a legal basis for humanitarian intervention without Security Council authorisation in
existing international law, it is hardly realistic in the foreseeable future that states should
altogether refrain from such intervention if it is deemed imperative on moral and political
grounds.”); OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 118, 125-26
(1991) (finding that while unilateral humanitarian intervention is illegal, if supported generally by states it should be pardoned).
17
KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 10, at 4, 163–98 (2000).
18
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp [hereinafter THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT].
19
For a discussion of the emergence of this concept, see Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to
Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 99 (2007); Carlo
Focarelli, The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and Humanitarian Intervention: Too Many
Ambiguities for a Working Doctrine, 13 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 191 (2008); see also Lee
Feinstein & Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Duty to Prevent, 83 FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2004,
136, 137 (“Like the responsibility to protect, the duty to prevent begins from the premise that
the rules now governing the use of force, devised in 1945 and embedded in the UN Charter,
are inadequate.”).
20
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 18, ¶ 6.37.
21
The Secretary-General, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change, ¶ 203, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2005); see also id. ¶¶ 196, 272.
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including to the seriousness of the threat, the proper purpose of the interveners, the exhaustion of other means, proportionality, and a balancing of
the ensuing consequences.22 The U.N. Secretary-General thereafter generally endorsed the high-level panel’s approach,23 though without expressly
adopting the five criteria or expressly ruling out unilateral humanitarian
intervention.
An important component in the diversity of views on this issue concerns the role of the Security Council. Proponents of unilateral humanitarian
intervention view the Council as an unreliable arbiter of the legality of uses
of force, since some permanent members have been willing to block actions
that a majority on the Security Council sees as appropriate. Again, the Kosovo incident presents the dilemma; many Security Council members favored armed intervention to protect Kosovar Albanians, but Russia (along
with China) opposed doing so. By contrast, opponents of unilateral humanitarian intervention argue that the whole point in drafting the U.N. Charter
was to create a system that—unlike the League of Nations system—would
attract participation by the major powers by according them a special status
for determining when non-defensive uses of force should be deployed and
when they should not. By moving away from that system, the special status
of the permanent members of the Security Council is degraded, thereby
introducing a level of instability in the system by making it less attractive to
the major powers. For opponents of unilateral humanitarian intervention, the
solution to the problem of Security Council inaction is not to abandon the
existing system, but instead to remain faithful to the Charter as written, with
the hope that the permanent members will generally act in unison when
situations truly requiring humanitarian intervention arise. Indeed, opponents
of unilateral humanitarian intervention point out that Security Council unwillingness to authorize intervention often arises from the reluctance of any
state to step forward with the resources needed to respond to a humanitarian
crisis, a problem that is not solved by altering the focal point for authorizing
intervention.
Another important component in the debate over unilateral humanitarian intervention concerns the current status of the United States in international affairs. The United States is the preeminent military, diplomatic,
economic, political, and cultural power in the world. The United States can
marshal the resources needed for humanitarian intervention around the
globe in a way that is largely not available to any other state. At least in the
short run, many opponents of humanitarian intervention are not very worried about lots of other states aggressively invoking the doctrine of humani22

Id. ¶ 207.
The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, ¶ 135, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005).
23
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tarian intervention, at least no more so than they are worried about those
states invading neighbors on spurious grounds of self-defense. Instead,
many worry about an unchecked United States—in conjunction with its
allies—deploying military force to protect human rights when it wishes to
do so, and refraining in situations where it prefers inaction. They would like
to see more global supervision of the U.S. decision to intervene and perhaps
even a global ability to prod the United States into action when it would
otherwise stay home.
B.

Looking for an Arbiter of Legality

States and scholars participating in this debate have emphasized different sources as a means of supporting one position or the other. When
assessing incidents of state practice that arguably constitute unilateral humanitarian intervention, one approach has been to scrutinize the formal and
informal reactions of important organs, such as the Security Council, the
General Assembly, or the International Court of Justice, since these entities
might be seen as serving as a “jury” for the global community about the
legality or legitimacy of the conduct. As Thomas Franck, who coined the
term in this context, indicated:
Pronouncing on the validity of claims advanced in mitigation of an unlawful but justifiable recourse to force is the task of those decision-makers.
Some of this fact-and-context-specific calibration goes on in international
tribunals, but most of it occurs in the political organs of the UN system,
which constitutes something approximating a global jury; assessing the
facts of a crisis, the motives of those reacting to the crisis, and the bona
fides of the pleas of extreme necessity. This jurying goes on not only in instances of humanitarian intervention but whenever there is a confrontation
between the strict, literal text of the Charter and a plea of justice and extenuating moral necessity.24

This jurying function might be performed before the intervention
takes place (ex ante jurying) or, more likely, after the intervention takes
place (ex post jurying). For Professor Franck, these organs have “demonstrated their ability and readiness, when faced with states’ recourse to force,
to calibrate their responses by sophisticated judgment, taking into account
the full panoply of specific circumstances.”25 Consequently, after analyzing
eight incidents of possible unilateral humanitarian intervention, Franck concludes that the “jurors” have regarded such actions as being justified.26

24
25
26

FRANCK, supra note 1, at 186.
Id.
See id. at 135–73.

2009]

CRIMINALIZING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

353

Professor Franck’s approach has intuitive appeal. The original
meaning of the U.N. Charter can change in light of subsequent U.N. practice, even on core issues relating to the Security Council. The U.N. Charter
is, after all, a multilateral treaty (“albeit a treaty having certain special characteristics”)27 one that is subject to the customary rules of treaty interpretation, which take account of both the object and purpose of the treaty and of
subsequent state practice.28 There is ample World Court jurisprudence supporting the use of subsequent state practice when interpreting the charters or
constitutions of international organizations, as well as supporting the use of
a principle of effectiveness, whereby the Court seeks to determine the purposes and objectives of the organization and to give to the words in question
an interpretation which is most conducive to the achievement of those
ends.29 To a certain extent, the entire history of Security Council conflict
management is one that finds no clear textual support in the U.N. Charter:
the numerous U.N. peacekeeping deployments have no express or even
strongly implied basis in the Charter; and Security Council authorization of
forcible deployments—such as authorization of the coalition of states that
expelled Iraq from Kuwait—are not firmly anchored in the original scheme
of Articles 43-49, which contemplated national contingents being made
available to the United Nations “on its call” for deployment under U.N.
command and control. 30
At the same time, Professor Franck’s approach has been criticized
for failing to explain certain methodological choices that are implicit in his
analysis.31 Most of the analysis turns on the conduct of the Security Council,
rather than other organs, which is an important methodological choice, since
it favors “jurying” by just fifteen states, including the five powerful permanent members, rather than the broader community of states. Further, it is not
clear how Franck’s methodology weighs the reluctance of intervenors to
explicitly base their action upon a right of humanitarian intervention, nor
why the failure of an organ to act should be construed as tacit approval of an
intervention.
In fact, the above-mentioned U.N. organs have been unable or unwilling consistently either to authorize or to prohibit recourse of humanitarian intervention ex ante, or to scrutinize incidents of alleged humanitarian
27
Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 157 (July 20).
28
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 5, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
29
See generally Elihu Lauterpacht, Development of the Law of International Organization
by the Decisions of International Tribunals, 152 RECUEIL DES COURS 414–65 (1976-IV).
30
Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, art. 43, 59 Stat. 1031, TS 993 [hereinafter
U.N. Charter].
31
See Michael Byers, Book Review, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 721 (2003).
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intervention after they have arisen, thus undermining those organs’ ability to
forcefully condemn, support, or support with caveats the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention. Ex ante authorization by the Security Council sometimes has been possible (thereby obviating any need to resort to
unilateral humanitarian intervention), but no other organ has acted ex ante
either to authorize or to prohibit unilateral humanitarian intervention. Some
have speculated that, after Kosovo, perhaps Security Council practice would
evolve into use of an “inverted veto” on issues of humanitarian intervention,
whereby any collective intervention would be deemed permissible unless
the Security Council passed a resolution precluding the action.32 No apparent consensus has formed among states regarding the acceptability of such
an approach, perhaps because it opens a rather wide loophole. Any group of
states, perhaps as small as just a few, could declare themselves a “collectivity” and proceed with an intervention, so long as they are confident that they
have the support of at least one permanent member (thereby avoiding a resolution cutting off the intervention). Further, any permanent member could
conduct humanitarian interventions without worry, since it could always
veto a Security Council resolution to the contrary.
The problem with post hoc reactions by these organs is that they are
unpredictable (sometimes formal reactions are made and sometimes they are
not) and can be viewed as political in nature (it is not always clear that the
members of the institution are reacting based on their perception of what
international law requires, as opposed to each member’s political preferences). Thus, opponents and proponents of unilateral humanitarian intervention, looking at the same practice of these institutions, will draw quite
different conclusions about the meaning and relevance of the institutional
conduct.
Consider, for example, the possibility of looking to the General Assembly for ex ante or post hoc authorization or prohibition of an intervention. This possibility is already available, under the General Assembly’s
1950 “Uniting for Peace Resolution,”33 which contemplates General Assembly “recommendations” for military measures in response to breaches of
the peace or acts of aggression. Under this resolution, any member state
may request that the General Assembly convene an emergency session,
which occurs promptly if a majority of U.N. members inform the Secretary32

Louis Henkin speculated that “the likely lesson of Kosovo is that states, or collectivities,
confident that the Security Council will acquiesce in their decision to intervene, will shift the
burden of the veto; instead of seeking authorization in advance by resolution subject to veto,
states or collectivities will act, and challenge the Council to terminate the action.” Louis
Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of “Humanitarian Intervention,” 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 824, 827
(1999).
33
G.A. Res. 377 (V), U.N. Doc. A/RES/377 (V) (Nov. 3, 1950). The resolution was
adopted by a vote of 52-5, with 2 abstentions.
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General (or seven members of the Security Council) that they concur in the
request.34 By doing so whenever a situation has arisen where unilateral humanitarian intervention seems imminent, or has already occurred, the General Assembly could serve as the definitive “juror” on the legality of the
matter. (Alternatively, the General Assembly might adopt an entirely new
organic resolution specifically on the subject of humanitarian intervention,
either flatly prohibiting it or in some fashion supporting it. In the latter case,
such a resolution could conceivably contain an “inverse” authorization,
meaning that a proposed humanitarian intervention, once notified to the
General Assembly, can proceed unless there is an affirmative General Assembly vote that the intervention should not occur.)
For political, formal, and practical reasons, the General Assembly
has not assumed this mantle. Politically, there is disagreement among states
on what to do about the issue of humanitarian intervention; there would
likely not be a uniform position on either condemning or approving such
action, or approving it subject to certain conditions. Formally, the U.N.
Charter Chapter IV makes clear that the General Assembly plays a secondary role to the Security Council on matters relating to peace and security, 35
which generally chills the General Assembly from taking a lead on such
matters. Even if the Security Council is not exercising its “functions” in
respect of a particular dispute or situation, the General Assembly is only
supposed to make “recommendations” to the Security Council about how to
proceed, which can be construed as supporting military deployments consented to by the host state (the prototypical peacekeeping scenario), but not
the deployment of military units for an enforcement action.36
Moreover, as a practical matter, the General Assembly’s arrogation
of power through the Uniting for Peace Resolution never fully developed
during the Cold War despite constant deadlock at the Security Council. The
problem was that, to conduct any significant military intervention, the financial and military support of one or more of the major powers was
needed, and those states did not wish to see the General Assembly take the
lead in this area, since it would clearly detract from the power and significance of the Security Council.37 For the United States, this became especially
true as the General Assembly mutated over time from something relatively
within the control of the Western states to a body entirely outside their control. Consequently, if the General Assembly were to attempt an ex ante or
34

Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, Rule 8(b), U.N. Doc. A/520/Rev.17
(2008), available at http://www.un.org/ga/ropga.shtml.
35
U.N. Charter, supra note 30, art. 12(1).
36
See, e.g., N.D. WHITE, THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM: TOWARD INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
150-51 (2002).
37
Id.
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post hoc role for unilateral humanitarian interventions, it would likely face
situations where (1) it votes in favor of military action, but finds no support
among those states expected to conduct the action; (2) it votes in favor of a
military action, and certain states prove willing to conduct that action, but
those states neither wanted nor sought General Assembly approval; or (3) it
votes against a military action, and one or more powers go forward anyway
on grounds that the General Assembly cannot arrogate to itself this power.
Any of these scenarios would weaken the authority of the General Assembly, and inhibits this organ from venturing into the arena.
The International Court of Justice also faces difficulty in serving as
a reliable “juror” for either ex ante or post hoc authorization/prohibition of
unilateral humanitarian intervention. In some ways, the International Court
could be an ideal surrogate for a deadlocked Security Council; like the
Council, the Court consists of fifteen members (judges), traditionally consisting of five judges from each of the permanent members of the Security
Council and ten judges from the different regions of the world. However,
unlike the Security Council, there is no veto power in the International
Court; judges from the major powers can and have been outvoted by the
other judges. Although regarded by some as a bit ossified, the Court is a
serious institution; there is a gravity to the work of the Court that garners
respect in the legal world and there is a fair amount of fidelity by states to
the Court’s rulings.38 Further, as a judicial institution its pronouncements
are generally regarded as driven by law not politics.
The Court, however, does not have jurisdiction simply to assume
the role of deciding ex ante or post hoc the legality of a proposed/actual
exercise of unilateral humanitarian intervention; the matter must be properly
placed before the Court. The most likely manner for this to occur would be
through a request for an advisory opinion from the General Assembly.
Probably for the same reason that the General Assembly is resistant to serving itself as a “juror” of a proposed intervention, the General Assembly has
declined to place potential incidents of humanitarian intervention, such as
Kosovo, before the International Court for consideration. As for contentious
cases, since the Court’s inception, jurisdiction over the lawfulness of forcible action has arisen in only a handful of cases; states do not habitually
resort to the court when force has been used against them, and when states
do, they are often constrained in the jurisdictional basis that they can plead.
Such jurisdictional limitation is amply demonstrated in Georgia’s recent
case against Russia for the movement in August 2008 of extensive Russian
troops into Georgia—a case predicated on an alleged Russian violation of
Article 2(4), but instead on a violation of a human rights treaty concerning
38

See generally CONSTANZE SCHULTE, COMPLIANCE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (2004).
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racial discrimination.39 Hence, the Court’s capability for “jurying” on this
subject is quite limited.40
Regional organizations also face difficulty in serving as an ex ante
or post hoc “juror” of the legality of recourse to humanitarian intervention.
Chapter VIII of the Charter clearly contemplates the ability of states, operating regionally, to deal “with such matters relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action.”41
Yet while that language in Article 52(1) is not conditioned upon authorization of the Security Council, in Article 53(1),42 where reference is made to
“enforcement action,” Security Council authorization is required. Moreover,
the credibility associated with non-defensive actions of regional organizations derives from the consent granted by their member states to help promote peace and security within the region; that theory breaks down when
the regional organization is operating outside the region, such as NATO did
in Serbia.
In short, while various existing international entities above might
serve as “jurors” of the legality of a proposed or actual resort to unilateral
humanitarian intervention, there are formal, practical, political, and institutional difficulties in any one of them serving that function consistently. For
that reason, the emergence of the ICC, and its anticipated jurisdiction over
the crime of aggression, might portend a significant development for assessing the legality of humanitarian intervention. As discussed in the next section, that role would not entail approving in advance an act of unilateral
humanitarian intervention; an ex ante ICC approval process is not contemplated as part of the amendment of the Rome Statute. Rather, the ICC’s role
will arise in the course of its reactions post hoc to instances of unilateral
39

See Application Instituting Proceedings, Application of the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.) 2008 I.C.J. __ (Aug.
12), available at http://www.icj-cij.org. The treaty at issue is the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
40
If the Court were asked to provide an opinion ex ante, the Court likely would resist any
association with the unleashing of military power, in part out of a general preference for the
pacific settlement of disputes and in part from a concern of blessing an intervention that goes
badly. Moreover, as a legal institution, the Court is not especially well-positioned, prior to an
intervention, to weigh complex non-legal variables, such as the motives of intervening states,
the efficacy of further diplomatic efforts, or the ramifications to regional security if an intervention goes forward. A post hoc assessment of an act of humanitarian intervention, if rendered, might well be hostile to the intervention, since to date the Court in post hoc interpretations concerning the use of force has eschewed progressive interpretations of the law. See
The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9); Military and Paramilitary
Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27); Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nig.; Eq. Guinea intervening), 2002 I.C.J. 303 (Oct. 2002); Oil Platforms (Iran v.
U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161 (Nov. 6).
41
U.N. Charter, supra note 30, art. 52(1).
42
Id. art. 53(1).
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humanitarian intervention, which might—if certain hurdles can be overcome—have a very different impact than the irregular and politicized post
hoc reactions of the institutions discussed above.
II. CRIMINALIZING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AT THE ICC
Article 5(1)(d) of the Rome Statute includes the “crime of aggression” as one of the crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court.43 Yet the actual exercise of that jurisdiction was made conditional. According to Article
5(2), the Court shall only exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression
once an amendment to the Rome Statute is adopted, which would define the
crime and set forth the conditions under which the Court can exercise its
jurisdiction in this regard.44 It is anticipated that the Assembly of States
Parties, formed after the entry into force of the Rome Statute, will vote at
their review conference in 2010 to amend the Rome Statute so as to allow
ICC exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. In considering the
effect, if any, of such jurisdiction on the legality of unilateral humanitarian
intervention, three core issues must be considered: (1) the hurdles that must
be overcome in the process of amending the Rome Statute; (2) whether
substantively the act of unilateral humanitarian intervention will be within
the scope of the new jurisdiction; and (3) what decision-maker will “trigger”
the application that jurisdiction for any given incident.
A.

Hurdles for Amending the Rome Statute

As is the case whenever one prognosticates about the possible effects of a new treaty (or, as in this case, amendment to an existing treaty),
there are certain procedural hurdles that must be overcome before any possible effects can unfold. First, the Assembly of States Parties does have to
vote at its review conference in 2010 to amend the Rome Statute. At least a
two-thirds majority is needed to adopt an amendment;45 it is possible that
the matter will be deferred and it is even possible that no amendment ever
occurs. Second, once adopted, it is generally thought that seven-eighths of
the existing member states must ratify or otherwise accept the amendment
before, after one year, it can enter into force.46 As of July 2008, there were
43
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5(1)(d) July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
44
Id. art. 5(2); see Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court: The Negotiating Process, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 2, 10 (1999) (discussing the treatment of the crime of aggression in the negotiation of the Rome Statute).
45
Rome Statute, supra note 43, art. 121(3).
46
Id. art. 121(4). Some delegations at the negotiations have argued that Article 5(2) of the
Rome Statute only requires adoption of the crime at the review conference, with no further
need for ratifications. See International Criminal Court, Assembly of State Parties, Report of
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110 parties to the Rome Statute, which means at least 97 states would need
to ratify any amendment, a process that could take many years.
Third, normally once an amendment of the Rome Statute enters into
force; it binds all the states parties, even those parties that have not yet ratified the amendment.47 In this case, however, since the amendment is expected to alter Article 5 of the Rome Statute, there is a special provision in
the Rome Statute that results in the amendment only binding those states
who have ratified or accepted the amendment. As such, it is generally
thought that any state party who does not accept the amendment may avoid
exercise of the Court’s new jurisdiction with respect to acts committed by
that state’s nationals or on its territory.48If this is correct, then states that are
currently parties to the Rome Statute—including those most likely to engage in acts of humanitarian intervention, such as France or the United
Kingdom—could decline to accept the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression, which would then preclude the Court from addressing their conduct. Therefore, even if the amendment enters into force, if the powerful
states parties take advantage of the opt-out clause, the ICC’s jurisdiction
over this crime will be seriously diminished.
Fourth, while there are 110 parties to the Rome Statute, there are
some 82 states that have not yet ratified the Statute and are not bound by it,
whether amended or not. As such, the conduct of a significant percentage of
states worldwide (43%) are outside the scope of the ICC—including certain
major powers that might engage in future interventions (China, Russia, the
United States)—leaving the ICC with little ability to address all incidents of
potential humanitarian intervention whenever they arise. This problem may
be overcome by continuing the gradual adherence by states to the Rome
Statute; it is not yet clear whether a plateau inmembership has been reached
or whether ratifications will continue apace. Alternatively, it is possible that
the ICC states parties will craft or interpret the ICC’s new jurisdiction so as
to cover acts of humanitarian intervention by non-party states whenever
they are directed against party states. If so, the ICC may regard itself as
capable of exercising its jurisdiction by virtue of the aggressive act being

the Special Working Group, Seventh Session (second resumption), ¶ 10, ICC Doc. ICCASP/7/SWGCA/2 (Feb. 20, 2009) [hereinafter 2009 Special Working Group Report]. If such
a view were to prevail, it would remove a significant hurdle to the activation of this crime.
47
Id.
48
Id. art. 121(5). Once seven-eights of the parties ratify or accept the amendment, any
party who has not accepted it may also withdraw completely from the Rome Statute. Id. art
121(6). The anomaly presented by Article 121(5) has led to extensive discussion in the negotiations over alternative possibilities for entry into force, to preclude parties from opting out
of the Court’s jurisdiction over this crime. See 2009 Special Working Group Report, supra
note 46, ¶¶ 6–9. Again, if any of these proposals were to prevail, it would remove one of the
hurdles to activation of this crime.
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inflicted upon one of its parties, thus expanding the range of acts encompassed by the new jurisdiction.
In short, there are several important, threshold hurdles that must be
overcome before the ICC will have robust jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression. If any of these hurdles are not surmounted, then the effects of
this jurisdiction on the debate over legality or illegality of humanitarian
intervention will be severely reduced if not eliminated, because the ICC’s
jurisdiction will not be applicable to the wide range of state conduct within
which such interventions may arise.
B.

Whether the New Jurisdiction Will Encompass Acts of Unilateral
Humanitarian Intervention

Assuming that the ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is
established, and is applicable to a wide range of states, then an important
question is whether that jurisdiction will encompass acts of unilateral humanitarian intervention. Prior to the adoption of the Rome Statute, the United States opposed inclusion of the crime of aggression in part because it
believed deployment of force for “humanitarian purposes” had transformed
the issue of aggression into a far more complicated concept than was the
case at Nuremberg or Tokyo.49 That position, obviously, did not prevail,
suggesting that the states negotiating the Rome Statute ultimately decided
that, whatever complications might exist in either including or excluding
humanitarian intervention, the matter could be addressed as part of the
process of defining the crime. The Preparatory Commission established
following the Rome Conference did not squarely address the issue of humanitarian intervention,50 nor to date has the Assembly of States Parties or its
Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, which was created in
2002 to discuss the definition, elements, and jurisdictional conditions of the
crime of aggression. While some external observers have suggested express
treatment of this issue, such as by carving out unilateral humanitarian intervention from the crime of aggression,51 so far no language to that effect has
49
See Press Release, International Criminal Court Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Legal Prosecution of Aggression Required
Agreed Definition, Preparatory Committee on International Criminal Court Told, at 2, U.N.
Doc. L/2765 (Mar. 27, 1996) (recounting position taken by the United States).
50
See Roger S. Clark, Rethinking Aggression as a Crime and Formulating Its Elements:
The Final Work-Product of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal
Court, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 859 (2004) (discussing background on the work of the Preparatory Commission on the crime of aggression).
51
See Benjamin B. Ferencz, Deterring Aggression by Law - A Compromise Proposal (Jan.
11, 2001), available at http://www.benferencz.org/arts/44.html (unpublished paper). Former
Nuremberg prosecutor Ben Ferencz proposed that the amendment include the following:
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emerged publicly in the working group’s proposed articles on the crime of
aggression.
Attention has been given, however, to only covering acts of aggression that are especially grave in nature. Indeed, several states have indicated
a preference for a definition of aggression that is not co-terminus with Article 2(4) of the Charter,52 viewing aggression as an especially serious violation of Article 2(4). For that reason, some states proposed to the Preparatory
Commission that the crime of aggression encompass only conduct involving
“aggressive” or “large-scale” attacks on territorial integrity that are of a
“particular magnitude and dimension and of a frightening gravity and intensity.”53 The United States, in its status as an observer, agreed that “the crime
of aggression be reserved for acts of a certain magnitude and not include all
uses of force that are inconsistent with article 2, paragraph 4.”54 This preference has remained in the discussions within the Special Working Group. At
the December 2007 meeting, there was broad support for retaining, after the
term “act of aggression,” the phrase “which, by its character, gravity and
scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.”55 Some lesser support was expressed for further qualifying “act of
aggression” by language stating, “such as, in particular, a war of aggression
or an act which has the object or result of establishing a military occupation
of, or annexing, the territory of another State or part thereof.”56
[H]umanitarian intervention by the use of force without prior authorization by the
Security Council shall not constitute an act of aggression if it is shown that the intervention was a last resort after other available means had been exhausted, that the
intervention was for purely humanitarian purposes and not motivated by the selfinterest of the intervening party, and to the maximum extent possible, was carried
out in a manner designed to protect the human rights of all persons concerned.
Id.; see also Jennifer Trahan, Defining “Aggression”: Why the Preparatory Commission for
the International Criminal Court Has Faced Such a Conundrum, 24 LOY. L.A. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 439, 449 (2002).
52
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
53
See, e.g., Proposal Submitted by Germany: The Crime of Aggression, ¶ 10,
PCNICC/2000/WGCA/DP.4 (Nov. 13, 2000); see also Theodor Meron, Defining Aggression
for the International Criminal Court, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1, 4 (2001) (“The
second benchmark the crime should satisfy is the principle of gravity or seriousness. Aggression is the ‘mega’ crime . . . It should not be trivialized or made banal by including in its
definition lesser violations of states’ territory integrity.”).
54
United States, Statement by the United States to the ICC Preparatory Commission on
the Crime of Aggression, at 2 (Sept. 26, 2001) (on file with author).
55
International Criminal Court, Assembly of State Parties, Report of the Special Working
Group on the Crime of Aggression, Sixth Session, ¶ 25, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/1
(Dec. 13, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 Special Working Group Report]; see also 2009 Special
Working Group Report, supra note 46, at 11 (repeating this language in draft Article 8 bis, ¶
1).
56
2007 Special Working Group Report, supra note 55, ¶ 26.
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At first glance, the inclusion of such “threshold” language might be
thought to implicitly carve out unilateral humanitarian intervention from the
scope of the crime, since this intervention has as its objective humanitarian
concerns not territorial aggrandizement. Yet the act of unilateral humanitarian intervention can be just as violent and intrusive as any other large-scale
use of force, involving extensive aerial bombardment and the deploying of
extremely large numbers of armed forces from one state to another. The
“character, gravity, and scale” of Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia in
1978, the tripartite intervention in northern Iraq in 1991, or NATO’s bombing of Serbia in 1999, is comparable in nature or scale to other uses of force
that presumably are to be encompassed in the ICC’s jurisdiction over this
crime. Even the more restrictive threshold language defining “aggression”
as “an act which has the object or result of establishing a military occupation” does not appear to exclude all humanitarian interventions; in all three
of the arguably humanitarian interventions noted above, foreign forces remained in the targeted territory for extended periods of time as they accomplished their claimed humanitarian objectives. Rather than carve out humanitarian intervention, the purpose of the threshold language now being discussed in the Special Working Group seems to be to eliminate minor incidents of armed force from the crime of aggression, such as frontier incidents
involving border patrols or coast guards. While the final language is not
settled, it does not appear that humanitarian intervention will be either expressly or implicitly excluded from the ICC’s definition of the crime of aggression.
A further important development related to defining the crime of
aggression may be the drafting of the detailed “elements” of the crime by
the Assembly of States Parties. Article 9 of the Rome Statute provided for
the adoption by two-thirds of the Assembly of “elements” for the crime of
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, which now serve to
guide the ICC judges in their interpretation of such crimes.57 While the
Rome Statute does not require the adoption of such “elements” for the crime
of aggression, the Special Working Group was assigned this task, though at
present it appears unlikely that such elements will be drafted in time for the
2010 Review Conference (the elements for the other crimes were also not
completed when the Rome Statute was adopted; they were only completed
thereafter by the Preparatory Commission prior to entry into force of the
Rome Statute). Assuming that an amendment to the Rome Statute activating
the crime of aggression is adopted in 2010, the elements for the crime may
be developed thereafter and adopted by the Assembly at some point prior to
entry into force of the amendment. If so, the language of the “elements” of
the crime of aggression might be quite significant for indicating whether the
57

See Rome Statute, supra note 43, art. 9.
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States Parties believe that humanitarian intervention is regarded as within or
outside the scope of “aggression” (as well as for indicating whether other
forms of conduct, such as rescue of nationals, falls within aggression). Alternatively, like the amendment itself, detailed resolution of what constitutes
aggression might not be possible, leaving the matter ambiguous on the matter. If the latter, then any effect on the debate over the legality of humanitarian intervention will turn on the ICC’s response to incidents of intervention
as they arise.
C.

The “Trigger” for Applying Jurisdiction over Aggression When a
Situation Arises

The Rome Statute requires that one of three conditions must first be
met prior to the exercise of ICC jurisdiction. For any given crime, the ICC
may only investigate and prosecute acts that were: (1) committed on the
territory of, or by a national of, a state party to the Rome Statute; (2) committed on the territory of, or by a national of, a state that has consented ad
hoc to the jurisdiction of the ICC; or (3) referred to the ICC by the Security
Council.58 For the crime of aggression, it is anticipated that there will be an
additional “trigger” or “filter” before the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction.
Some of the current proposals before the Special Working Group
envisage jurisdiction being triggered only if the Security Council has determined that an act of aggression was committed by a state or, at least, has
adopted a resolution asking the Prosecutor to proceed with the investigation
(the latter is sometimes referred to as a “strong green light” by the Security
Council).59 Such proposals are supported by the permanent members of the
Security Council and by a few other states, but to date are not supported by
most states parties to the Rome Statute.
Other proposals envisage allowing the matter, in the first instance,
to be addressed by the Security Council. However, in the absence of Security Council action, these proposals envisage the prosecutor after a period of
time (e.g., six months) proceeding with the investigation on the prosecutor’s
own initiative or, alternatively, proceeding if authorized by a “filter” other
than the Security Council. These filters include: (1) when authorized by the
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber; (2) when the General Assembly has “determined
that an act of aggression has been committed”; or (3) when the International
Court of Justice makes such a determination, presumably in the form of an
58

Id. arts. 12–13.
See 2009 Special Working Group Report, supra note 46, at 12 (draft Article 15 bis, ¶¶
1–3 & 4 (alternative 1)). For arguments in opposition to the Security Council being the exclusive trigger for ICC jurisdiction over this crime; see Troy Lavers, [Pre]Determining the
Crime of Aggression: Has the Time Come to Allow the International Criminal Court its
Freedom?, 71 ALB. L. REV. 299 (2008).
59
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advisory opinion after a request by the General Assembly, though possibly
in the course of a contentious case as well.60
If the crime of aggression in a particular situation may only be pursued upon a finding by the Security Council that an “act of aggression” has
occurred, then the ICC’s jurisdiction over this crime may not have any significance whatsoever, let alone have an impact on the legality of humanitarian intervention. The Security Council virtually never declares that transboundary uses of force are acts of aggression; even North Korea’s attack on
South Korea in 1950 and Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait were characterized
by the Security Council as a “breach of international peace,” not an act of
“aggression.”61 As such, if the triggering mechanism is a Security Council
finding of “aggression,” then the ICC’s jurisdiction over this crime may
well be still-born.
If a possible crime of aggression may be investigated simply upon a
request of the Security Council to the ICC (without a Security Council finding of “aggression”), then the ICC’s jurisdiction over this crime might also
be severely curtailed. The willingness of the Security Council to issue such
a request may be just as unlikely as a finding of “aggression.” Certainly,
such a request will not be issued in situations where any of the permanent
members is the state (or is closely allied with the state) allegedly perpetrating the aggression. Hence, under this approach the ICC’s jurisdiction might
be reduced solely to instances where a relatively isolated or “outlaw” state
has engaged in the conduct (e.g., Iraq in 1990), such that there is sufficient
support on the Security Council and among the permanent members for
issuing the request. If so, the erratic nature of the ICC’s jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression likely would have little effect in clarifying the legality
of unilateral humanitarian intervention, for the failure to prosecute such
conduct as a crime could be interpreted as the result of major power politics,
rather than a belief that the underlying conduct is permissible.
A similar outcome may be likely if the amendment only allows the
ICC to proceed, in the absence of Security Council action, whenever the
General Assembly or the International Court has “determined that an act of
aggression has been committed.” Like the Security Council, the General
Assembly has only rarely found “aggression” to have occurred, letting pass
by fairly momentous incidents of forceful action within any such condem-

60
2009 Special Working Group Report, supra note 46, at 13 (draft Article 15 bis, ¶ 4
(alternative 2)).
61
See S.C. Res. 660, U.N. S/RES/660 (Aug. 2, 1990); S.C. Res. 665, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/665 (Aug. 25, 1990). In a few instances, some relatively minor in nature, the Security
Council has declared conduct to be “aggressive” or “acts of aggression.” See UNITED
NATIONS, HISTORICAL REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION 225–36 (2003)
(noting instances relating to Benin, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Tunisia).
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nation.62 A General Assembly request to the International Court for an advisory opinion63 on whether “aggression” has occurred seems equally unlikely; certainly no such request has been made to the International Court over
the past sixty years even in situations where blatant aggression has occurred. Moreover, when on the rare occasion that the legality of acts of
force have arisen on the merits in a contentious case, the Court has limited
itself to finding a violation of the principle of “non-use of force” expressed
in Article 2(4) of the Charter (or its counterpart in customary international
law),64 not a finding of an “act of aggression.”65
One might speculate that an amendment to the Rome Statute will
change the practice of the Security Council, General Assembly, or International Court. Arguably, once those institutions know that their determinations concerning aggression will have a collateral consequence for the work
of the ICC, then those institutions may be more apt to focus on the issuance
of such a determination. If the amendment has that effect, then perhaps the
discussion outlined below concerning a triggering mechanism involving just
the ICC will be relevant for a triggering mechanism that turns on Security
Council, General Assembly or ICJ action. But if the amendment does not
62

See HISTORICAL REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION, supra note 61,
at 242–50; see also CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 21 (2d ed.
2004) (citing as examples Turkey’s incursion into Cyprus, Iran’s attack on commercial shipping during the Iran-Iraq War, and the United States in Grenada and Nicaragua).
63
While the Security Council could also ask for such an advisory opinion, the presumption here is that the Security Council is unwilling or unable to act. Certain specialized agencies of the United Nations have also been empowered to ask advisory opinions of the International Court, so long as the matter is within the scope of the organization’s mandate. In this
instance, it seems likely that no specialized agency would be found competent to ask such a
question. For the Court’s conclusion that the World Health Organization was not competent
to ask a question about the legality of nuclear weapons see Legality of the Use by a State of
Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflicts, Advisory Opinion, 4 (1996).
64
See Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 92 (June 27); Land
and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nig.; Eq. Guinea intervening), 2002 I.C.J. 303, 450
(Oct. 10); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Repub. Congo v. Uganda),
2005 I.C.J. 168, 227 (Dec. 19).
65
At best, one might try to argue that the Court’s findings in these cases are the functional
equivalent of a finding of “aggression.” See Mark S. Stein, The Security Council, The International Criminal Court, and the Crime of Aggression: How Exclusive is the Security Council’s Power to Determine Aggression?, 16 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 18–25 (2005). That
argument is unpersuasive, given the care with which the Court (like the Security Council)
chooses its language, as well as the Court’s refusal to find “aggression” even when specifically requested to do so by a party in the case. It is especially unpersuasive in the context of
Oil Platforms, given that, while the Court did find that the U.S. actions could not be justified
as measures “necessary to protect the essential security interests,” the Court nevertheless
found no violation of international law within the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) 98 AM. J. INT’L L, 554 (July 2004).
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change existing practice, then it seems that any approach to the triggering of
ICC jurisdiction that requires action by those institutions would have little
effect in clarifying the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention.
If, however, the language ultimately adopted in amending the Rome
Statute allows for the prosecutor to proceed in the absence of Security
Council action, either on the prosecutor’s own initiative or after authorization by the Trial Chamber, then there may well be significant ramifications
over the long term for the debate on the legality of unilateral humanitarian
intervention. In such circumstances, the mere fact that the ICC mandate is
broad enough to allow the prosecution of leaders that engage in humanitarian intervention will likely not affect the debate about the legality of humanitarian intervention. Only if the Rome Statute were amended so as to expressly identify unilateral humanitarian intervention as a form of aggression
would the position of opponents of the legality of humanitarian intervention
be strengthened, just as an express exclusion of such intervention as a form
of aggression would strengthen the position of humanitarian intervention’s
proponents. What will count is how the ICC responds when incidents of
unilateral humanitarian intervention arise. Prosecutions, or at least indictments, of leaders of those interventions will considerably strengthen the
hand of those who oppose unilateral humanitarian intervention. Yet an unwillingness on the part of the ICC to indict and prosecute those leaders—an
outcome that seems quite likely for incidents of true humanitarian intervention—will lend considerable credence to the view that unilateral humanitarian intervention is either lawful or tolerated by the international community.
An ICC prosecutor (or prosecutor in conjunction with the Pre-Trial
Chamber) is extremely unlikely to indict the leader of a state who has embarked on a transboundary use of force that is truly designed to end a widespread deprivation of human rights. If the intervention is conducted in a
manner approximating the kinds of criteria that have been identified for
“true” humanitarian intervention—such as the five criteria of “legitimacy”
formulated by the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change66—both legal and political dynamics will push the prosecutor away from indictment. The legal dynamics include the general discretion the prosecutor has not to indict in situations where it would appear
unjust to do so, which undoubtedly will exist when the intervening state is
attempting to stop a very seriousness threat to human lives, has exhausted
other available means, and is limiting the intervention to what is necessary
and appropriate to remove the threat. The Rome Statute provides that the
prosecutor, when deciding whether it initiate an investigation, shall consider
66

207.

Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, supra note 21, ¶

2009]

CRIMINALIZING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

367

whether, “[t]aking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of
victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.”67 Further, to the extent that
there is uncertainly about the criminality of a particular kind of conduct, the
Rome Statute provides that the “definition of a crime shall be strictly construed” and that in “case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in
favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.”68 Finally,
the Rome Statute provides that a person shall not be criminally responsible
if the person is acting to reasonably defend other persons,69 or in circumstances where the conduct was caused by “duress resulting from a threat of
imminent death or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm against”
persons, so long as the person “acts necessarily and reasonable to avoid this
threat” and “does not intend to cause a greater harm that than the one sought
to be avoided.”70 Provisions of that sort provide a prosecutor with ample
ability to engage in a nuanced assessment of whether in a given situation the
overall interests of justice have been served by conduct that might technically fall within the scope of aggression, but that should not be sanctioned.71
Moreover, the legal dynamics may include certain benefits secured
by the Prosecutor from the intervention, since the target state might well be
one harboring persons already under indictment by the ICC and the intervening states can assist in bringing those persons into ICC custody (an initiative they will be less enthusiastic about if their leaders are themselves facing indictment). The political dynamics include the difficulty for the ICC of
condemning an intervention that is either popular or largely tolerated by
states and the broader global community, particularly if intervenors are a
collective of states that are generally supportive of the ICC, perhaps including major financial supporters. Even of the intervenor is just a single state, if
the objective is to oust a horrific regime, one that has committed extensive
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and perhaps even genocide (Idi Amin
in Uganda or the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia), the ICC’s political stature
may suffer considerably if it is perceived as protecting that regime.
67

Rome Statute, supra note 43, art. 53(1)(c). On the interplay between prosecutorial discretion to make decisions based on “interests of justice” and the traditional prerogatives of
the Security Council under Chapter VII, see Jens David Ohlin, Peace, Security, and Prosecutorial Discretion, in THE EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
(Carsten Stahn & Göran Sluiter eds., 2008).
68
Rome Statute, supra note 43, art. 22(2).
69
Id. art. 31(1)(c).
70
Id. art. 31(1)(d).
71
For an argument on why “necessity” should excuse state responsibility for humanitarian
intervention (as opposed to excusing criminal responsibility of state leaders), see Ian Johnstone, The Plea of “Necessity,” in International Legal Discourse: Humanitarian Intervention
and Counter-terrorism, 43 COLUM. J TRANSNAT’L L. 337, 357–566 (2005).
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Could the Prosecutor find a way to avoid indicting the leaders of the
intervening state(s) without establishing any precedent for the legality of the
intervention? As is the case for statements by public officials of states, it is
certainly possible for the ICC Prosecutor to be silent or at least vague about
the reasons for not initiating a prosecution, or to announce that lack of evidence exists on certain points necessary to pursue a criminal case against
government leaders.72 Obfuscation can go a long way in making it difficult
for a clear legal precedent to emerge. At the same time, there may be considerable pressure upon the prosecutor to indicate clearly the position being
taken by the ICC, just as there was when various states, human rights organizations, and others charged that NATO’s conduct of the 1999 bombing
campaign against Serbia violated the laws of war. In that instance, the chief
prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) felt compelled to establish a committee within the Office of the
Prosecutor to examine the allegations. After receiving and reviewing the
committee’s detailed report (which was subsequently made public), she
informed the U.N. Security Council that there was no basis to open a criminal investigation into any aspect of the NATO campaign.73 Similarly, in a
situation where the ICC has declined to investigate or prosecute the leaders
of a campaign of unilateral humanitarian intervention, the ICC prosecutor
may be expected to report to the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome
Statute on the factors that led to that decision, including specific reasons
why the intervention is considered “humanitarian.”74
72
Defendants before the ICC are presumed innocent, with the onus on the prosecutor to
prove guilt. Rome Statute, supra note 43, art. 66. Not only must the materiel elements of the
crime be proven, but also that the defendant committed those acts with intent and knowledge,
id. art. 30, with no mistake of fact or law negating that mental intent. Id. art. 32.
73
For the prosecutor’s statement to the Security Council, see U.N. SCOR, 4150th mtg., at
2–6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4150 (June 2, 2000). For the committee’s report, see ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 39 I.L.M. 1257 (2000).
74
While the Rome Statute provides that the Office of the Prosecutor shall act independently, the Assembly of States Parties is mandated to provide management oversight to the Prosecutor. Rome Statute, supra note 43, art. 112(2)(b). At each meeting of the Assembly, the
Prosecutor addresses the Assembly, providing a detailed update of the situations and cases he
is handling. See, e.g., Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Address to the Assembly of States Parties (Nov. 30, 2007). Further, the ICC Secretariat prepares annual reports to
the Assembly on the work of the major organs of the ICC, including the Office of the Prosecutor. See, e.g., International Criminal Court, Report on Programme Performance of the
International Criminal Court for the Year 2007, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/7/8 (May 26, 2008). In
instances where a situation has been referred to the ICC by the U.N. Security Council, the
Prosecutor reports directly to the Council on the matter. See, e.g., Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Seventh Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court
to the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005) (June, 5 2008), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C4584AF2-6A72-4BB0-94E6-45F43CE18F68/277787
/UNSC_2008_En.pdf.
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The ICC might also try to argue that its failure to condemn an intervention as “aggression” does not necessarily mean that the ICC regards the
intervention as a lawful use of force, since the ICC’s concept of aggression
aims at the most grave of forcible acts. For two reasons, however, that distinction may not prove significant. First, while the current drafts on the definition of aggression do contemplate a narrower class of forcible actions
than those covered by Article 2(4), the forcible actions being excluded seem
relatively insignificant, such that the term “aggression” is an inexact but
close approximation of Article 2(4). Indeed, the proposed amendment leans
heavily on the General Assembly’s 1974 resolution on the definition of aggression, which begins by stating that “[a]ggression is the use of armed
force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Charter of the United Nations”75—language that mimics Article 2(4). As
such, it will not seem very credible for the ICC to argue that an act of humanitarian intervention falls outside the scope of its crime of aggression,
unless the intervention is of a very minor nature (e.g., a speedy rescue of
hostages that involves no loss of life). Second, a distinction of this type will
likely be lost in the public domain; when the ICC determines that the leaders of an intervention will not be investigated or indicted for aggression, the
natural perception is that the ICC believes the intervention to be legal. Arguing that an intervention might still be a violation of Article 2(4) but just is
not within the scope of the ICC’s jurisdiction is the type of position that will
likely gain little traction in the realm of political and popular discourse,
which tends to approach such issues in more a black/white (legal/illegal)
fashion.
Establishing the unlikelihood of the ICC indicting the leaders of
states who embark on unilateral humanitarian intervention is difficult, given
the embryonic status of the ICC. In an attempt to at least sketch out this
point, however, the next section considers what would have happened if an
ICC with jurisdiction over the crime of aggression had existed at the time of
NATO’s intervention with respect to Kosovo.

75

G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 6, art 1.
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III. WOULD THE ICC HAVE INDICTED NATO’S LEADERSFOR THE CRIME OF
AGGRESSION FOR THE KOSOVO INTERVENTION?76
A.

Effect of ICC Jurisdiction Prior to the Kosovo Intervention

The underlying facts of NATO’s 1999 intervention in Serbia (then
known as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or FRY) on behalf of Kosovar
Albanians has been amply recounted elsewhere and will not be repeated
here.77 Needless to say, given that the intervention seemed largely directed
at protecting an ethnic group from its own government (a government that
had unleashed considerable strife in the Balkans in the first half of the
1990s), the intervention stirred an extensive debate about its legality, with
considerable attention focusing on whether the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention was a viable component of contemporary international law.78
Assuming the existence of an ICC at the time with jurisdiction over
the crime of aggression, would that fact alone have inhibited NATO states
from engaging in such intervention? Article 2(4) of the Charter itself is
broad enough in scope to be viewed by many states and scholars as precluding humanitarian intervention, yet that fact alone did not inhibit NATO
from proceeding. Rather, most NATO states asserted that their conduct was
lawful without reliance on the doctrine of humanitarian intervention for
support.
For example, the United States relied upon various factors that,
when taken together, the United States believed justified the action. These
factors included: (1) the commission by the FRY military and police of serious and widespread violations of international law in the FRY province of
Kosovo against Kosovar Albanians; (2) the threat that FRY actions in Kosovo could lead to a wider conflict in Europe; (3) the FRY’s failure to
comply with agreements with NATO and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe regarding FRY actions in Kosovo; (4) the FRY’s
failure to comply with Security Council resolutions regarding FRY actions
in Kosovo; (5) the FRY’s failure to cooperate with the International Crimi-

76
Comments in Part II on the Kosovo incident draw in part upon reflections made by the
author at the annual meeting of the American Society of International Law in 2000. See Sean
D. Murphy, The Intervention in Kosovo: A Law-Shaping Incident?, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC. 302, 302 (2000).
77
See, e.g., THE INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO
REPORT (2000); TIM JUDAH, KOSOVO: WAR AND REVENGE (2000); IVO H. DAALDER &
MICHAEL E. O’HANLON, WINNING UGLY: NATO’S WAR TO SAVE KOSOVO (2000).
78
See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Editorial Comments: NATO’s Kosovo Intervention, 93 AM. J.
INT’L L. 824 (1999).
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nal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia; and (6) the FRY’s failure to abide
by its own unilateral commitments.79
Would the additional factor of the ICC possibly indicting NATO
leaders have altered the situation? The answer to that question would seem
to turn on whether NATO leaders would have anticipated the ICC indicting
them, for only then might NATO leaders have been deterred. Since the ICC
is a new institution, there is no track record for understanding its practice
for issuing indictments in such situations and, until that practice settles, the
ability to deter may be weak. The next sub-section concludes that the ICC
likely would not have indicted NATO leaders for their intervention in Kosovo. If that assessment is correct, and if NATO leaders would have predicted a similar outcome, then the existence as of early 1999 of an ICC with
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression likely would not have had any effect in deterring the Kosovo intervention.
B.

Likelihood of ICC Prosecution after the Kosovo Intervention

After conducting an investigation, a prosecutor considering whether
to indict leaders of NATO for the Kosovo intervention would likely have
begun with the text of the Rome Statute and the elements of the crime of
aggression. The analysis would have continued by noting that the U.N.
Charter prohibits the use of force (Article 2(4)) absent Security Council
authorization (under Chapters VII or VIII) or when acting in self-defense
(Article 51). Although there were certain Security Council resolutions
passed in advance of the intervention relating to Kosovo, which in part recognized the situation as a “threat to international peace and security,” those
resolutions did not authorize the use of force.80 And, although some assertions were made that Europe as whole was threatened by the conflict in Kosovo (since other states such as Turkey and Greece might become involved), those assertions seemed thin at the time and even thinner today. In
any event, NATO and its member states did not report the intervention to
the Security Council as provided for in Article 51. State practice since
enactment of the Charter has not altered these basic provisions of the Charter.81 As such, at first glance it seems that a prosecutor would have viewed

79
See SEAN D. MURPHY, UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 1999-2001,
392–94 (2002).
80
S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999); see S.C. Res. 1160,
S/RES/1160 (Mar. 31, 1998); S.C. Res. 1199, S/RES/1199 (Sept. 23, 1998); S.C. Res. 1203,
S/RES/1203 (Oct. 24, 1998); S.C. Res. 1239, S/RES/1239 (May 14, 1999).
81
On pre-Kosovo practice, compare MURPHY, supra note 1, at 83–144, and Jean-Pierre L.
Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 4 CAL.
W. INT’L L.J. 203 (1974) (finding little support in state practice for unilateral humanitarian
intervention), with TESÓN, supra note 15 (finding support).
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the decision by NATO leaders to unleash the intervention as a crime of aggression.82
At the same time, the prosecutor would have been confronted with a
constellation of other factors weighing against indictment. First, the prosecutor would have presumably seen some significance in the types of factors
that animate the natural law tradition. Under that tradition, rather than just
parse the language of the Charter and related state practice, the natural law
theorist would emphasize the moral necessity of acting to prevent the widespread deprivation of human rights. This tradition emphasizes that any international rule focused on the preservation of order at the expense of justice is destined to fail, and thus the law must allow for intervention in extreme cases. Since intervention to protect human rights seeks neither to alter
territorial boundaries nor to depose existing governments, it does not endanger the core attributes of sovereignty that Article 2(4) seeks to protect
territorial sovereignty. While everyone would prefer the original Charter
scheme of a well-functioning Security Council capable of deploying forces,
the unfortunate reality is that the Security Council has no such forces at its
disposal and, due to political exigencies, at times is paralyzed from even
authorizing individual states to act on its behalf, such as occurred with respect to the crisis in Kosovo. In such situations, states cannot be expected to
stand by while people die; the Charter was not a suicide pact.83 If the prosecutor perceived such factors to be present, then it would weigh against indictment; for all prosecutors, their discretion not to indict turns not solely on
the formal content of the law, but on extraneous factors that are more contextual in nature.
Second, a prosecutor would no doubt be influenced by the fact that
this “unilateral” humanitarian intervention involved sixteen NATO countries—fully democratic and therefore fully accountable to their people—
collectively deciding that the intervention was justified as a matter of international law and policy. Thirteen of those countries actually engaged in the
bombing campaign. Further, while some non-NATO states asserted that the
82

See, e.g., Ian Brownlie & C. J. Apperley, Kosovo Crisis Inquiry: Memorandum on the
International Law Aspects, 49 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 878 (2000), & Further Memorandum, 49
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 905 (views by counsel for the FRY as to why the intervention was neither legal nor “humanitarian”); Jonathan Charney, NATO’s Kosovo Intervention, 93 AM. J.
INT’L L. 834, 834 (1999) (“Indisputably, the NATO intervention through its bombing campaign violated the United Nations Charter and international law.”); Bruno Simma, NATO, the
UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (1999) (examining the legality
of the threat or use of force just prior to the bombing campaign). A few positivists believe
that prior to the intervention in Kosovo there was sufficient state practice to support humanitarian intervention in extreme cases. See, e.g., Christopher Greenwood, International Law
and the NATO Intervention in Kosovo, 49 INT’L COMP. L.Q. 926 (2000).
83
See W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comments: NATO’s Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo’s
Antinomies, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 860 (1999).
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intervention should not have gone forward without Security Council authorization, many non-NATO states supported the intervention.
There were, of course, states that quite openly opposed the intervention, notably China, India, and Russia, as well as states typically hostile to
all major actions pursued by the United States, such as Cuba. And there
were other states that were clearly uneasy with the intervention but fell short
of formally condemning it. Public protests occurred in various states
worldwide. Yet, while reasonable minds can differ, the intervention received relatively widespread acceptance—whether viewed as affirmative
support or passive toleration—of a kind not seen in some prior incidents of
unilateral humanitarian intervention. In light of this, for a prosecutor to
claim that the intervention in Kosovo was unlawful would likely face considerable criticism from a variety of quarters.
Third, the prosecutor would have noted the reactions of key international organizations to the intervention. In particular, when a resolution
condemning the air campaign was placed before the Security Council on
March 26, 1999, the resolution was defeated by a vote of 12 to 3.84 Among
those 12 states were several non-NATO members, such as Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Gabon, Gambia, Malaysia, and Slovenia. Similarly, a Russian
draft resolution before the U.N. Commission on Human Rights calling for
“an immediate cessation of the fighting” and attributing “victims and casualties amongst the civilian population [to] missile strikes and bombings”
failed by a vote of 11 to 24, with 18 states abstaining.85
The prosecutor would have noted that the General Assembly did not
condemn the intervention, as it did when Vietnam intervened in Cambodia
in 1978 and when the United States intervened in Grenada and Panama in
1983 and 1989. Nor did the General Assembly even pass a resolution demanding a withdrawal of forces, as it did when India intervened in East
Pakistan in 1971. Meanwhile, the Prosecutor would have noted that the Organization of the Islamic Conference declared that “a decisive international
action was necessary to prevent humanitarian catastrophe and further violations of human rights” in Kosovo.86
Fourth, the prosecutor would be influenced by the series of factors
that ultimately led to the first deployment of war by NATO forces since its
inception: (1) in Serbia, there was a government with a track record of brutal ethnic cleansing that was inflicting increasing levels of violence against a
84

U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3989th mtg., at 6, UN Doc. S/PV.3989 (Mar. 26, 1999).
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, Report on the
Fifty-Fifth Session, ¶¶ 35–36, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/167 (July 20, 1999).
86
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civilian population in one of its historically autonomous regions; (2) the
Security Council had expressly identified actions taken by the government
as a threat to the peace which could lead to humanitarian catastrophe even if
it had not yet; and (3) that government had refused to abide by the demands
of the Security Council, including agreements that the government itself has
made with the international community and that had been endorsed by the
Security Council.
Fifth, the prosecutor would be influenced by the “end game” of the
intervention: are the interveners seizing territory as part of their “humanitarian intervention” or is there conduct generally perceived as limited to what
is necessary and proportionate in carrying out the humanitarian objective?
In the case of Kosovo, the Security Council itself—with Russia’s affirmative vote—ultimately accepted the reality of the intervention by authorizing
activities associated with the cease-fire agreement, an agreement negotiated
fully with Russian involvement.87 While Serb forces were basically expelled
from Kosovo, Kosovo did not fall within the dominion of an aggressor; it
was patrolled by a NATO-led multinational coalition, including Russian
troops. Again, Security Council action to move forward with conflict management should not be viewed as a wholesale endorsement by all Security
Council members of all preceding actions, but Russia’s and China’s willingness to support this new U.N. administered territory would likely have
influenced the decision of an ICC prosecutor as to whether to indict.
Sixth, the prosecutor perhaps would be influenced by the broader
scenario unfolding in terms of crimes other than the crime against aggression. In a situation of true humanitarian intervention, it is likely that the
leaders of the targeted state have committed violations in the form of crimes
against humanity, genocide, or widespread war crimes. As such, the ICC
may well be focused on the leaders of the targeted state, just as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) at the time of
the Kosovo intervention was already focused on Serbia’s leader, Slobodan
Miloševi, for his conduct in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. In
May 1999, in the midst of the NATO bombing campaign in support of Kosovar Albanians, Miloševi was indicted for 340 counts of murder, stemming from seven separate massacres, and some 740,000 forced deportations
from Kosovo since the beginning of 1999.88 For an international criminal
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tribunal to declare, on the one hand, that the leaders of a country committed
acts of violence against civilians but, on the other hand, it is a crime for
others to stop them, would place the tribunal in a very awkward position.
Similarly, if the tribunal determines that the intervening states adhered to the jus in bello in the course of their intervention—as was determined by the ICTY in assessing NATO’s conduct in the Kosovo intervention89—that too may influence the prosecutor’s decision regarding the crime
of aggression. While as a theoretical matter, it is certainly possible to commit a violation of the jus ad bellum while committing no violations of the
jus in bello, it might prove politically awkward to find the former but not
the latter.
Finally, while a prosecutor may be somewhat insulated from external pressures, and is not a political entity such as the Security Council or
General Assembly, only the most naive observer would reject the possibility
of political influences on the prosecutor. A prosecutor would have had to
possess a rather sturdy confidence to proceed with indictments for the crime
of aggression against multiple leaders of Western democratic states, including U.S. President Bill Clinton, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder
and the Italian Prime Minister Massimo D’Alema, especially when some of
those countries are major financial supporters of the tribunal. Indeed, some
observers believe NATO did commit jus in bello violations in the course of
its bombing campaign,90 such that one explanation for the lack of indictments with respect to jus in bello crimes is the old saw “don’t bite the hand
that feeds you.”
IV. EFFECTS OF CRIMINALIZING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
The ironic effect of activating a crime of aggression that is broad
enough in scope to cover an act of unilateral humanitarian intervention may
be to crystallize, over time, a norm that regards such intervention as lawful.
Assuming that the crime of aggression (and associated elements) is drafted
so as to neither expressly include nor exclude unilateral humanitarian intervention, and instead to simply criminalize large-scale transboundary uses of
force, the definition will sweep within its range humanitarian interventions
that take the form of bombing campaigns or deployment of military forces,
such as was seen in NATO’s action against Serbia in 1999. Assuming further that the Security Council, General Assembly, or International Court of
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Justice are not the sole triggering mechanisms for determining if an act of
aggression has occurred, then considerable discretion will be accorded the
ICC prosecutor (perhaps in conjunction with the Pre-Trial Chamber) to determine which forcible acts are lawful and which are not. As such, when the
ICC is confronted in the years to come with an intervention that is not authorized by the Security Council but that is truly humanitarian, it seems
likely that the ICC will not regard such conduct as aggression, resulting in a
perception that unilateral humanitarian intervention is lawful. A further
effect may be clarification by the ICC of what constitutes “true” humanitarian intervention. As indicated in Section II, when deciding not to investigate or prosecute the leaders of states that have engaged in such intervention, the ICC prosecutor may feel compelled to explain publicly why ICC
action is not forthcoming. Presumably the prosecutor would focus on the
kinds of criteria that have been previously suggested for humanitarian intervention, such as by the recent U.N. high-level panel or in the academic
community.91
This article has focused on how activating the ICC’s jurisdiction
over the crime of aggression may affect the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. However, if the analysis above is correct, then there may be a variety of other effects relating to other types of transnational uses of force,
such as the use of military force by one state against another state to rescue
its nationals or to restore to power a democratically-elected leader who was
ousted by a military coup. Like humanitarian intervention, these other forms
of transnational use of force have their critics and supporters when it comes
to assessing legality. Were the ICC to begin weighing in on whether such
forcible actions constitute aggression, it may considerably influence the
legal debate, leading to crystallization and clarification of the relevant norm
one way or the other.
If all this comes to pass, the result may be to place the ICC in a very
significant position as the ultimate arbiter of lawful uses of military force,
one that will shape the contours of the jus ad bellum over the next generation. Supporters of the ICC may welcome this development, applauding its
ability to clarify a field of law that currently seems unstable and, at times,
ineffective.92 If the Security Council remains unable to act because of major
power resistance, the ICC—perceived as objective and non-political in nature—may emerge as the relevant voice in condemning or blessing transnational uses of force.

91

See Report of the High-level Panel, supra note 21, ¶ 207; MURPHY, supra note 1, at
382–87.
92
See Sean D. Murphy, Protean Jus Ad Bellum, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 22 (2009),
http://www.boalt.org/bjil/docs/BJIL27.1_Murphy.pdf.

2009]

CRIMINALIZING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

377

Yet such power would bring with it considerable risks. If the ICC is
seen as the “go-to” arbiter for whether an intervention is permissible, and if
the ICC blesses an intervention as humanitarian and not aggressive in nature, then considerable political repercussions may flow for the ICC if the
intervention ultimately goes poorly, perhaps with the intervening state(s)
mishandling relief operations, inadvertently provoking internal strife, failing
to rebuild infrastructure destroyed by the intervention, or neglecting fundamental rule of law initiatives necessary to stabilize the targeted state. Conversely, the ICC might condemn, through the issuance of indictments, a use
of force that ultimately proves extremely successful in replacing a tyrannical regime with one that is much more disposed toward representative democracy and human rights. Further, if there is insufficient consistency and
practice in the role of the ICC in this area, broader adverse consequences
might unfold as well. Unless the relevant lines are clearly drawn by the ICC,
the core normative structure of the jus ad bellum might be weakened, especially if a belief emerges that some undefined forms of non-defensive force,
undertaken without Security Council authorization, are acceptable. Moreover, to the extent that the ICC emerges as the central player in assessing the
legality of recourse to force, it does so at the expense of the Security Council, which may harm the reputation and status of the global institution
charged with maintaining international peace and security. (In order to recapture that role, the Security Council might be more inclined to address
squarely the legality of uses of force when they occur, which would be a
positive development for collective security.)
Potential “blowback’ from decisions reached by the ICC are not
fatal to its work, and will occur to some degree in any event for decisions
reached by the ICC concerning the other types of crimes within its jurisdiction. Yet the stakes are considerably higher with respect to the crime of aggression, and while being at the center of attention has some benefits, it can
also mean being at the center of a precarious and potentially damaging
storm.

